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developed in this study. Based on results of a landscape review of the Indian AgTech ecosystem as well as 
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surveys of and interviews with AgTech startups and investors in Hyderabad, eight recommendations on 







Executive Summary  
 
Digital technologies and services are rapidly expanding in virtually every aspect of the global economy and 
society, and the agriculture sector is no exception. This expansion creates new opportunities to deploy 
massive, agile, personalized, cost-effective, and digitally-enabled agricultural services capable of reaching 
even the poorest and most vulnerable populations1, 2 and driving a new digital revolution in agriculture that 
may prove to be as consequential as the Green Revolution of 1965-1986. There are, however, significant 
challenges that need to be addressed to ensure this revolution does not by-pass smallholder farmers and 
includes the widespread adoption and use of digital agricultural technology among them.  
  
To ensure that a digital agricultural revolution is inclusive and benefits a majority of smallholder farmers (as 
some have suggested did not occur in the first Green Revolution3,4) two interrelated challenges need to be 
addressed. First, how can the assets of the digital revolution -- namely the vast increase in data types and 
volume, applications, and data processing 5 -- be leveraged most effectively to benefit large numbers of 
smallholder farmers? Second, how can the innovations created by the digital revolution be guided such that 
they can be transformative for smallholder farmers? If these challenges are unmet, smallholder farmer 
participation in the digital agricultural revolution will be inadequate. A core obstacle to meeting these 
challenges is that most smallholder farmers cannot afford many of the agricultural digital technologies that 
are being offered today because they are too expensive or the farmers perceive they do not provide any 






1 Fabregas, Raissa, Michael Kremer and Frank Schilbach. “Realizing the potential of digital development: the case of 
agricultural advice.” Science, Volume 366 (Issue 6471), 13 Dec 2019. 
2 Cole, Shawn and A. Nilesh Fernando.  “The value of advice: Evidence from the adoption of agricultural practices.” 
Harvard Business School, 2014. 
3 Hazell, Peter. “The Impact of Agricultural Research on the Poor: A Review of the State of Knowledge” in Shantanu 
Mathur and Douglas Pachico (Eds) Agricultural Research and Poverty Reduction: Some Issues and Evidence. Centro 
Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT): Cali, Colombia, 2003. See the discussion on pp. 51-52 for an overview of this 
line of argument. 
4 Pingali, Prabhu. “Green Revolution: Impacts, limits, and the path ahead.” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, volume 109 no. 31, 2012,  p. 12304. 
5 Meola, Andrew. “Smart Farming in 2020: How IoT sensors are creating a more efficient precision agriculture industry.” 
Business Insider, Jan. 24, 2020. 
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An influential innovation strategy framework may provide a way forward in helping to address the two 
challenges. Clayton Christensen, the noted economist who wrote extensively on disruptive innovation, 
argued that new market entrants can play an important role in lowering the costs of expensive products 
and services, enabling poorer, underserved consumers to become paying customers.6 Innovation strategist 
Greg Satell further developed and applied part of Christensen’s theory. Satell suggests methods to map, 
target, and manage innovation activities; he notes that the potential of disruptive innovation to drive costs 
lower and increase access to customers may be especially true for digital technology innovations.7 This study 
builds on Christensen’s and Satell’s research and examines how to extend agricultural technology markets 
to poor, underserved customers in the context of the Indian agricultural sector.  
 
The study has two objectives. The first is to develop a better understanding of the challenges that digital 
agriculture (“AgTech”) startups face as they seek to progress from proof of concept to profitable growth, and, 
ultimately, to operation at large scale. The focus is on startups because they can play a critical role in 
extending AgTech innovation and services to a broader consumer base, including poorer customers, and 
help build an inclusive digital agriculture revolution. If Christensen’s argument holds true, new market-
entrant startups can drive down costs and expand the reach of AgTech services and innovation in ways that 
established firms are incapable of doing or are unwilling to do. The second objective is to synthesize useful 
knowledge based on these results and develop recommendations for actions that help accelerate AgTech 
startups’ transitions to scale so they can serve smallholders profitably, equip food and farming systems with 
new tools to sustainably increase productivity, and support their adaptation to changing climatic and 
economic conditions.   
 
Our recommended actions are based on evidence collected from the study. A landscape review of the 
national Indian AgTech startup ecosystem provides for a macro perspective of conditions, while a more 
focused survey-interview based case study of AgTech startups and investors in and around Hyderabad 
provides a micro perspective. Five intersecting dynamics observed in the study need to be mitigated for 
more Indian AgTech startups to transition to scale: 
1. Smallholder farmers are poor:  The economic reality of the AgTech sector is that smallholder 
farmers tend to be poor and are not yet viable startup customers. 
 
2. Inadequate investment: There is a lack of financial investment in the AgTech ecosystem.  
 
3. AgTech adoption is slow: Digital technology adoption is slower in the agriculture sector than in 
other sectors. 
 
4. Insufficient data: There is insufficient data about on-farm contexts and priorities that could drive 
business cases and help target AgTech innovation objectives.  
 
5. The AgTech ecosystem is young: The AgTech ecosystem is still developing and most startups are 
in the early development stages. 
 
These results suggest that there are eight broad-based actions that can help accelerate Indian AgTech 
startups’ transitions to scale: 
 
1. Support supply and demand aggregation: Supply and demand aggregation can help startups acquire 
more customers by facilitating an increased or more concentrated customer base, the lack of which 





6 Christensen, Clayton. A Theory of Economic Growth. Clarendon Lectures in Management Studies, Oxford University, 
June 19, 2013. 
7 Satell, Greg. Mapping Innovation: A Playbook for Navigating a Disruptive Age. New York: McGraw Hill, 2017. 
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such that new entrants can access markets, which supports ecosystem maturation. Implementing 
digital platforms, for example, can fractionalize the use of capital-intensive equipment or products (such 
as tractors, other farm equipment, and cold storage) across a large number of infrequent users who 
would be otherwise unable to afford the equipment or product. Demand among them is aggregated 
and cost recovery is accelerated by distributing any return on investment revenue across a greater 
number of customers. Creating an economy of scale dynamic of this type may prove to be a key success 
factor that allows more technologies to reach smaller farms. 
 
2. Facilitate the bundling of technologies and services around multiple customer needs :    Bundling 
agricultural services with other services such as pay-as-you-go solar power, digital financial services, and 
data connectivity, for example, could provide more diverse revenue streams and avenues for startups to 
reach financial stability. Bundling technologies and services effectively creates a multi-sided market and 
increases the potential customer base, and is an example of an important demand and supply 
aggregation strategy.  
 
3. Support development of data for business case development: Public interest actors in government–
as well as commercial and social advocacy associations, and think tanks, among other organizations–
can help develop, curate, and disseminate business case data. This can help close gaps in the 
understanding of market conditions and expectations that commonly exist between investors and 
startups. In addition, this data can help startups develop more robust business plans that can better 
meet investor expectations. At the same time, investor expectations can be more realistically grounded 
by having a better understanding of agricultural processes.  
 
4. Target small-medium farms: Both the national Indian landscape study and the Hyderabad case study 
indicate that smallholder farmers are, for a range of reasons, unlikely to be early AgTech adopters and 
are among the least likely to be AgTech startup customers. This suggests that AgTech startups may have 
the best chance of reaching scale if they concentrate on small-to-medium sized farms as early adopters 
and focus their initial efforts on building a customer base in those states in which there are a smaller 
proportion of smallholder farmers (e.g. Nagaland, Punjab, Rajasthan) before expanding to states in 
which the proportion of poor farmers is very large (e.g. Kerala, Lakshadweep, and Bihar). 
 
5. Develop new connections between established FoodTech firms and small-to-medium sized farms 
to foster new, disruptive business models: Digital startups targeting the food distribution and 
consumption end of agriculture value chains (“FoodTech”) have established a much firmer foothold in 
the Indian market. One way to drive increased AgTech adoption by small-to-medium sized farming 
operations is to initiate connections between established firms in the $2.4 billion FoodTech sector and 
these farmers. Developing and fostering direct market connections for producers and direct sourcing 
relationships for FoodTech firms—particularly using data and digital technologies—may accelerate 
growth and profitability across both groups. Successfully developing such multi-sided markets would 
be a disruptive business model in the industry, changing how business is conducted and creating the 
potential to reach more customers. Public-interest actors—including government agencies, non-profits, 
and public-interest actors—could play an important role in launching these kinds of ventures.  
 
6. Incentivize investors: Public interest actors such as research organizations, non-profits, governmental 
grant making, and other financing institutions can incentivize investors by helping mitigate investment 
risks AgTech investors face. Public interest actors can do this through various interventions, such as 
making direct investments, offering public subsidies designed to assist farmers to transition to growing 
more profitable crops, promoting food quality standards required for large commercial food processing 
operations, and advocating for enabling regulatory frameworks that foster the increased access to and 
use of AgTech technologies (e.g., drones or sensor technologies) and data.  
 
7. Target the replication of other successful startup offerings with minor reconfiguration or 
innovation for scalability: Startups that replicate a key idea from or an approach of a competitor can 
bring new insight to the industry because they have learned from the actions and mistakes of 
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competitors, and can ultimately make a more successful offering. “Me Too” startups8 are valued by 
potential investors for this reason. Examples of this approach that have begun to gain momentum 
within the AgTech sector include using new digital platforms to intermediate key agricultural activities, 
such as digital platforms that enable the rental of farm equipment to facilitate convenient transactions 
between providers and customers, similar to how the ride-sharing service Uber links drivers and 
passengers. Similarly, digital platform strategies could be developed to leverage emerging technologies. 
This might include providing agricultural-specific remote sensing imagery and on-farm sensing 
technologies to develop new agricultural services. 
 
8. Build startup business capacities in agriculture: One key observation made by AgTech commentators, 
analysts, and investors is that AgTech startups are insufficiently familiar with the business of agriculture. 
They can neither articulate how their products will add value for farmers, nor can they explain how they 
intend to acquire customers beyond the initial growth stage and who will pay for these products. These 
observations indicate most startups in this space lack sufficient startup business capacity and 
agricultural domain expertise. 
 
These interventions point to ways that the AgTech industry can begin to realize its promise to serve millions 
of smallholder farmers in new ways, sustainably and at scale, in India. The findings are also broadly consistent 
with AgTech industry research in other developing economies. 
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Positive impacts on poverty reduction and lower food prices [experienced in the first 
Green Revolution] were driven in large part by crop … improvements in CGIAR [research] 
centers that were then transferred to national agricultural programs for adaptation and 
dissemination. 
 
Harnessing the best of scientific knowledge and technological breakthroughs is crucial 
for [the second Green Revolution] … as we attempt to re-establish agricultural innovation 




Prabhu Pingali, Cornell, 20129 
 
 
The Green Revolution (1965-1986) was a period in which the confluence of “crop research, infrastructure, and 
market development and appropriate policy”10 led to dramatic improvements in global crop production. Led 
largely by CGIAR research on crop genetics,11 researchers identified technologies that improved crop yields. 
“[B]etween 1960 and 2000 yields for all developing countries rose 208% for wheat, 109% for rice, 157% for 
maize, 78% for potatoes, and 36% for cassava.”12  
 
The technological basis for the first Green Revolution was largely improved crop seed quality via seed 
breeding. Disseminating these new seeds to farmers via national agricultural extension programs, the 
Revolution achieved significant increases in crop yields.13 Today, we are in a new digital technology era. While 
we face the same challenge —to increase crop production—,we also face new challenges in terms of 
sustaining farmer profitability, a host of pressing global environmental issues, and a need to support 
biodiversity. 
 
Today, the promise of new technologies at the intersection of the digital and life sciences have prompted 
some to ponder the potential that could be possible with the launch of a “Second Green Revolution”14 in 
which new digital technological innovations can be leveraged to benefit a greater number of people.15 This 
new Green Revolution would affect smallholder farmers who, some suggest,16,17 were largely bypassed in the 
first Green Revolution. While advances made in the initial revolution led to soaring agricultural production, 
most smallholder farmers have remained poor.  
 
In this next Green Revolution, smallholder farmers may be bypassed again because there is no clear model 
for digital agricultural technology (AgTech) to reach them. This is reflected in estimates that the rapidly 
expanding access to and use of digital connectivity has largely bypassed 70 to 80 percent of Sub-Saharan 
Africans and more than half of Southern Asians.18 New, high-powered digital services, such as remote 
sensing and artificial intelligence, can be leveraged with high capacity computation to tackle complex 
sustainability problems while balancing environmental, socioeconomic, biodiversity, and conservation goals. 
However, while these new technologies are blossoming,19 their benefits are currently largely beyond the 
means and reach of smallholder farmers. 
 
Smallholder farmers are unable to benefit from these increasingly rich data environments. They cannot 
access digital technology that can significantly boost their crop productivity and incomes because they lack 
both the money to buy new AgTech products and the confidence that these products can contribute to 
their income. In this scenario, smallholder farmers and AgTech service providers are subject to a cost-access 
dilemma that emerges from two core issues.20 First, smallholder farmers are often unwilling or unable to pay 





9 Pingali, Prabhu. “Green Revolution: Impacts, limits, and the path ahead.” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, volume 109 no. 31, 2012,  pp. 12302, 12307. 
10 Pingali, 2012, p. 12302. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Pingali, 2012, p. 12303. 
13 Pingali, 2012, p. 12302. 
14 Pingali, 2012, p. 12307. 
15 Fabregas, Kremer, & Schilbach, 2019.   
16 Pingali, 2012, p. 12304.   
17  Hazell, 2003, pp. 51-52. 
18Clement, J. “Worldwide digital population as of April 2020.” Statistica, June 4, 2020. 
19 Gomes et. al. 2019. 
20 The cost-access dilemma is that without a lower cost to access to a technology it is too expensive for widespread 
adoption and without widespread access, costs cannot be lowered.  
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startups or other business ventures catering to smallholder farmers. One study found that farmer 
willingness to pay for a mobile advisory service in Surendranagar, Gujara, for example, was approximately 
US$2, while the actual cost of the service was US$7, leaving a gap of roughly US$5.21  
 
Second, existing AgTech firms (and investors) often have little interest in acquiring smallholder farmers as 
customers since they can make greater profits elsewhere in other sectors that do not suffer from this kind 
of structural dynamic.22 Market-leading and other well-established private sector firms, which increasingly 
dominate agricultural sector innovation,23 focus on profit. This means that under-profitable market 
segments, which include most smallholder farmers, are unlikely to benefit from these firms’ innovations, as 
this potential customer demographic is the least able to generate profits for them. As a result, these market 
leading and other well-established private sector firms have been historically unwilling to enter poorer 
market segments.24  
 
One solution to this cost-access dilemma can be found in an influential theory on innovation strategies 
developed by noted economist Clayton Christensen. His groundbreaking work on disruptive innovation 
outlined how new market entrants, of which startups are a type of new market entrant, have played a key 
role in resolving the cost-access dilemma.25 Christensen noted that new market entrants are less entrenched 
in traditional profit models than established firms, and are, thus, more capable of developing viable business 
models and products for poorer, underserved markets.26 His work provides insights into how AgTech 
startups can play a critical role in introducing and diffusing digital technology innovation to rural, low-
income farmers, most of whom are not currently served by established private sector firms. 
 
For AgTech startups to play this key role it is critical for them to successfully transition from the growth stage 
to scale.27 To make this transition, startups need to grow their customer base from a few paying customers 
to a sufficient number of paying customers capable of making their business increasingly profitable. This 
transition is of paramount importance for the startup, but it is also, as Pingali suggests,28 critical to the entire 
agricultural sector since innovation is required to meet the sector’s changing future demands.  
 
Thus, a central question that this research addresses is how to mitigate this cost-access dilemma so that the 
vast increase in data, applications, and data processing29 can be leveraged to benefit smallholder farmers. A 
better understanding of how AgTech startups can achieve profitability can help answer this question.  
 
Based on our research observations and empirical results, a clearer understanding of the challenges AgTech 





21 Cole and Fernando, 2014, p. 3. 
22 Fabregas, Kremer, & Schilbach, 2019. 
23 Simons, Anthony.  “4 CGIAR Director Generals’ Approach to Big Data.” Decoding the Data Ecosystem Convention, 3-5 
October, 2018, Nairobi, Kenya, October 04, 2018. 
24 Christensen, 2013.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Prahalad, C. K. “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid.” Wharton School Publishing, 2004. 
27 Common startup development stages are: 
  
1. Customer & market discovery: identifying the product and customer markets. 
2. Product validation and market confirmation: confirm the product works as intended and that there are 
customers who are willing to pay for it. 
3. Initial customer engagement: initial sales of the product to first set of customers. 
4. Growth: increasing number of paying customers, but not to the point where profitability is possible. 
5. Scale: where market footprint increases and profitability and shareholder payoff is possible. 
 
This categorization is from World Bank. “Do mLabs Still Make a Difference?” Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2017, p. 11. 
28 Pingali, 2012, p. 12303.  
29 IBM estimates an average farm can generate 500,000 data points per day. Meola, 2020.  
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understanding and the supporting results are then synthesized into specific recommendations about how 
this process can be accelerated. If AgTech startups do not progress to scale, they will be unable to help drive 
the digital Green Revolution, which will be a significant missed opportunity to effect positive change for 




2 Technical Approach and Agenda 
 
To develop a better understanding of the challenges AgTech startups encounter when they transition from 
growth to scale and to generate useful knowledge about how this progress can be accelerated, we capture 
both micro and macro perspectives of what can impede and facilitate this transition.30  
 
To understand the macro perspective, we conducted a landscape review of the Indian AgTech ecosystem, 
drawing on more than 100 reports, analyses, published interviews, statistical compendiums, YouTube 
interviews or presentations, and academic, think tank, and industry publications on AgTech in India. A 
thematic analysis of this material focused on startups’ transitions to scale, including challenges and 
opportunities.  
 
For a micro perspective, we examined the Hyderabad AgTech startup ecosystem. Here, our methodology 
included three approaches to data gathering: we conducted an on-line survey of 42 investors and AgTech 
startup innovators, followed up with semi-structured interviews with 40 of them,31 and a held an in-person 
focus group discussion with them. We asked AgTech startups about their operations (what stage of 
development are they in, where they were three years ago, and whether they are working on their startups 
full time); about the investments they have received (how much, how many, from what types of investors); 
and about the challenges within the AgTech startup ecosystem they faced. We asked investors similar 
questions to learn their perspectives on the ecosystem (how much they have invested and with how many 
startups, at what startup stage they made their investment(s), what kinds of startups have they invested in, 
and why they have not made more investments in AgTech startups). While the sample size is low in absolute 
terms, so is the population from which they are drawn: the 21 AgTech startups in our sample represent about 
60% of the 36 Hyderabad AgTech startups active in 2019, as reported by the market research firm, Traxcn.  
  
The results of the landscape review are presented in section three and section four presents the Hyderabad 
case study survey results. Then, in section five, these results are synthesized into five underlying dynamics 
that impede AgTech startups’ transitions to scale. Section six advances eight specific interventions that may 
help startups accelerate their transitions to scale. 
 
In the landscape review and synthesis of results (sections three and four), the voice and actual words 
respondents and other observers used in their interview are fully maintained. As such, we have made the 
stylistic choice to italicize respondents’ and observers’ direct interview quotes in order to differentiate them 







30 For an analysis of innovation platforms scaling see Marc Schut  et al. “Guidelines for Innovation Platforms in 
Agricultural Research for Development. Decision support for research, development and funding agencies on how to 
design, budget and implement impactful Innovation Platforms.” International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), 
2017.  
31 For comparison, the CTA conducted 120 interviews for the 2019 Africa-wide Digitalisation of African Agriculture Report 
2018-2019. Wageningen, Netherlands: the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA), 2019, p. 17. 
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3 Landscape Review of the Indian AgTech 
Ecosystem 
 
The landscape review of the Indian AgTech ecosystem is based on industry, government, academic, and 
agricultural research center analyses and findings as well as journalistic reports. The landscape review 
reports on how many AgTech startups there are, where they are located, how much and how many 
investments in startups have been made, what agricultural market segments AgTech startups are active in, 
the challenges AgTech startups face in reaching more farmers, and what future opportunities for AgTech 
there may be.  
 
 
3.1 Where are agtech startups and how many are there? 
 
As of mid-2021, there were roughly 700 AgTech startups in India.32 They ranged from very early stage 
startups, which are often funded by the founders themselves, their friends, or family, to startups preparing 
to move their operations to scale. Of the 536 startups Traxcn, a research firm focused on serving venture 
capital investors, reported on in 2020, 40% are located in Karnataka or Maharashtra. Of those, the proportion 
of very early stage startups is likely very high as only 62 of the 536 received some type of investment. Despite 
this geographic dispersion, startups in Karnataka accounted for 64% of all AgTech investment.  These results 





32  Abhinav Singh.  “Agritech startups on the rise despite pandemic year.” The Week, May 31, 2021. 
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Chart 1: Geographic Distribution of AgTech Startup 33 
 
 








33 Traxcn data, 2020. 
34 Traxcn data, 2020. 





























3.2 Where Have AgTech Investments Been Made? 
 
 Historically, the only agri investors in India were impact investors.35  
 
Mark Kahn, Omnivore Venture Capital, 2018 
 
Omnivore Venture Capital co-founder Mark Kahn’s 2018 assessment is consistent with the findings of a 
2018 National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM) report, which found the amount 
of Indian AgTech startup investment grew from zero in 2013 to US$700,000 in 2014.36 By 2017, AgTech farm 
management solutions startup Cropin had received US$4 million in Series A investment from Beenext, 
Ankur Capital, and the BSP Fund.37 Then, in 2018, it received US$8 million in Series B financing from 
Chiratae Ventures and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. At this point, pure venture capital (“VC”) 
investors had made an entry into the world of AgTech startups, joining impact and social investors.38 By 
2020 Fasal, an artificial intelligence Internet of Things (IoT) precision agriculture startup, added US$1.6 
million to its 2018 US$120,000 initial investment, and Eruvaka, a startup providing digital solutions to 
acquaculture, had received almost US$7 million in total investments. 
 
These examples illustrate how digital innovation investments are now happening across the Indian food 
system, from the agricultural portion of the system that includes planting, growing, harvesting, storing, 
and transporting, where AgTech firms are active, through to the part of the food system in which 
consumable food products are made, sold, and delivered to consumers, grocery stores, and restaurants. 
FoodTech firms are active in this segment.  
 
While investments are being made throughout the Indian food system, AgTech startup investment 
significantly trails FoodTech startup investments. Indian FoodTech startups generated about US$2.2 billion 
in investment in 2019,39 including US$1 billion raised by FoodTech restaurant delivery startup Swiggy.40 
Demonstrating impressive growth in 2018, the amount of FoodTech investments made that year were 
280% greater than in 201741 and were 70% more than the US$1.66 billion raised from 558 deals in the five-
year period between 2013 and 2017.42 These estimates include urban e-groceries, online restaurants, and 
premium-branded food startups, all of which operate much further downstream from the farmer and 
other agricultural production activities served by AgTech startups.  
 
Indian AgTech startup investments have focused on on-farm inputs, commodities trading platforms, non-
food agricultural product processing, on-farm equipment, transport, and processing and have attracted an 
estimated maximum of US$189 million in investment in 146 deals between 2013 and 2017.43 Within that 
same five-year period, FoodTech had US$1.66 billion of investment, making the amount of investments 





35 Cheney, Catherine. “Why investors are looking at Indian ag tech startups.” Devex, 20 November 2018.  
36 NASSCOM, 2018, p. 11.  
37 Sachitanand, Rahul. “For India’s agri tech startups, the wind of change is finally here.” The Economic Times, Jul 03, 
2018.  
38 Cheney, 2018.  
39 AgFunder, 2020, p. 11. 
40 AgFunder. 2018a. “AgFunder AgriFood Tech Investment Report: Year Review 2018.” AgFunder.com, 2018, p. 3 
41 AgFunder. 2018a, p. 3. 
42 AgFunder, 2018b. “India AgriFood Startup Investing Report:  5-year review.” AgFunder.com, 2018, p. 10. 
43 AgFunder. 2018a, p. 3. 
44 AgFunder, 2018b, p. 11. 
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than the AgTech-FoodTech investment ratio in the rest of the world, where an estimated 40% of the funds 
invested in digital food system innovations flowed to AgTech startups.45  
 
While gaps between Indian AgTech and FoodTech investment began to close in 2015 and 2016, the gap 
widened in 2018 and 2019 until a dramatic and precipitous drop-off in FoodTech investment occurred. The 
amount of investment fell from US$2.2 billion in 2019 to US$741 million in 2020.46 This drop resulted in 30% 
of investment going to Indian AgTech firms, which is less than but closer to the average 40% share for 








46 AgFunder. “India 2020 Agrifood Startup Investment Report 2020.” AgFunder.com, 2020, p. 11. 
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AgFunder attributes the FoodTech startup investment fall-off in 2020 to investors focusing on previous 
investments “[R]ather than backing legions of new startups” and increased competition, when “retail giants 
like Amazon and Flipkart (owned by Walmart) began to aggressively compete”49 in Indian FoodTech market 
segments. While this may be the case, given that in 2019 more than half of the US$ 2.2 billion FoodTech 
startup investment went to Swiggy (US$1 billion) and Zomato (US$300 million),50 the 2020 fall-off observed 
may be the result of these two deals, which were outliers that temporarily bolstered the amount of overall 
investment rather than a systematic reduction in investment. Without these two deals, the amount of 
investments remains roughly the same from 2018 to 2020, as illustrated in Chart 3.  
 
In contrast to this drop, AgFunder reports the amount of AgTech investments more than doubled from 
US$145 million in 2019 to US$312 million in 2020, and has been steadily growing since 2015, as reported in 
Chart 4.51 However, this growth may be an optimistic view of the potential impact of AgTech for the farmer, 
as it was largely driven by increased investments made in food safety, transport, and processing solutions 
(collectively called “midstream technologies”), solutions to which farmers will be subsidiary beneficiaries, if 
they benefit at all. When midstream technologies are excluded from AgTech investment, there is actually a 






47 AgFunder, 2018b, pp. 14-15. 
48 AgFunder, “India 2020 Agrifood Startup Investment Report 2020.” 2020. p. 11. 
49 AgFunder, 2020, p. 4. 
50 AgFunder, 2020, p. 23. 





















Key Finding 1: Low On-Farm Investment 
 
Investment in AgTech startups lags significantly behind investment in FoodTech startups. This indicates that 




3.3 What agricultural market segments are AgTech startups  active in? 
 
To show the part of the food system in which AgTech startups are active, in we examine investment trends 
within six AgTech market segments in which the most investments have been made:  
 
• On-farm inputs;  
• Commodities trading platforms; 
• Non-food agricultural product processing;  
• On-farm equipment;  
• Midstream technologies (food safety, transport, and processing technologies); and 






52 AgFunder, 2018b, p. 21. 
53 AgFunder, 2020, p. 18. 




















A comparison of each segment’s total investment in 2020 to its five-year annual average from 2012 to 2017 
55 can provide a view of how the investments in each of these market segments has changed.  
 
Results show that two types of startups—midstream technologies and digital financial services for farmers—
drove AgTech investments to more than double. Midstream technology startups that offer food safety and 
traceability, logistics, transport, and processing solutions, and digital financial services for farmers that offer 
digital financial service solutions, accounted for more than 80% of total investment. Two startups offering 
digital financial services for farmers received US$57 million and 19 midstream technology firms received 
US$200 million in investment, with US$170 million of this going to six firms. Of this latter amount, US$99 
million was invested with Ninjacart alone.56  
 





Based on the overall investment amounts reported in Chart 5, it seems each of the market segments has 
grown in importance to the growth and support of extending AgTech to farmers, and especially so for those 
associated with bottom three bars. However, this result is based in absolute terms.   
 
Another view of how investment in AgTech has changed is to look at the difference in the proportion each 
segment had in the five-year annual average 2012-2017 and in 2020. This difference provides perspective on 
the relative change in the importance and attractiveness of that segment to investors.59 Chart 6 reports the 





55 Using a five-year annual average discounts the impact of annual outliers that may be present in a single year.   
56 AgFunder, 2020, p. 20. 
57 AgFunder, 2018b, p. 21. 
58 AgFunder, 2020, p. 18. 
59 To accomplish this analysis, the proportion of each annual average market segment to total investments made in 2013 
through 2017 and 2020 are calculated. Then, the percentage change in this coefficient–again, using the annual averages 
for 2013 through 2017 and 2020–is calculated. 
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market share is noted by ∑=.  The proportion of investments in midstream technologies, for example, grew 
by 89% and this area had 63% of the total investments made in 2020 (noted as ∑=63%).   
 
Our analysis finds three market segments grew and three contracted. Startups offering non-food 
agricultural processing solutions (feedstock, e.g.) grew by an astounding 410%, although they only made up 
3% of AgTech investments. Digital financial services for farmers and midstream technology investments 
grew by 223% and 89%, respectively, and had 18% and 63% of the investment market in 2020. Despite an 
absolute growth in investment, the more than 50 percent decline in the proportion of the investments in 
the on-farm inputs, on-farm equipment, and digital marketplaces sectors indicates these areas were less 
attractive to investors.  
 
Chart 6: AgTech investments in select sectors, percentage of market and change of percentage between 2013-2017 and 




These results suggest two conclusions. First, growth in AgTech investment is being driven by startups that 
alter markets rather than those that enhance productivity. Midstream technologies are addressing 
inefficiencies in the distribution and processing of agricultural products, generating revenue by improving 
the process, decreasing the cost of, or improving the quality of products in the distribution chain from the 
farm gate until the product reaches the consumer. Midstream technologies are predominantly focused on 
the off-farm portion of the food system. On-farm activities that increase production or decrease production 
costs were relatively less interesting for investors in 2020 than they were between 2013 and 2017.   
 











60 AgFunder, 2018b, p. 21. 
61 AgFunder, 2020, p. 18. 
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Key Finding 2: AgTech Investors are More Interested in Off-Farm than On-Farm Investments 
 
Growth in AgTech investment was driven by off-farm investments, which have grown relative to on-farm 
investments. This focus suggests that altering markets–specifically, making them more efficient—is seen as 




3.4 Challenges AgTech startups face reaching more farmers 
 
Startups in this space face two main challenges. First, they are wading into a market that has 
scant technology adoption (due to limited budgets and unease with its use) and second, their 
methods of selling will be different from urban India and startups operating there. 62 
 
Rahul Sachitanand, The Economic Times, 2018 
 
Our landscape review shows Indian AgTech startups face three key, interrelated challenges:  
  
1. A lack of financing; 
2. The existence of an understanding gap between startups and farmers; and  
3. Farmers are reluctant to adopt AgTech goods and services. 
 
These three issues are interrelated. A lack of available financing to target low income or rural market 
segments leads startups to target higher income, urban markets. Rural farmers may be slow to adopt digital 
technologies due to low awareness, suspicion of new, unfamiliar technology, and unwillingness to pay for 
unfamiliar goods and/or services. In addition, because many AgTech startups have an inadequate 
understanding of prospective agricultural customers, they can misidentify farmer priorities and 
misunderstand the risks and rewards with which their end customer may be presented. These challenges 
are mutually reinforcing and interactions among them present additional challenges. We discuss each of 
these core challenges in detail. 
 
 
Lack of Finance  
 
Agri tech is a totally different ballgame from urban-centric models that have dominated the 
headlines. … There’s a lack of capital. Agri tech ventures will raise a few million dollars in Series A if 
they are lucky, while their urban counterparts may get $10 million.63 
 






62 Sachitanand, 2018.   
63 As quoted in Sachitanand, 2018. 
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While technology can certainly improve efficiency and incomes in agriculture in a variety of ways, 
the dynamics of venture-capital-funded startups are suboptimal for building and marketing farm 
solutions.64 
 
Rahul Sachitanand, The Economic Times, 2018 
 
The landscape review of Indian AgTech startup investment trends supports these observations made by 
Bajaj and Sachitanand. A primary challenge associated with AgTech startups attracting investments is that 
farmers are often unable or unwilling to pay for AgTech startup goods or services in sufficient volumes for 
startups to generate sufficient profits. This is most often the case for those technologies targeting 
smallholder farmers. As potential consumers, smallholder farmers are not confident that AgTech can help 
them generate sufficient income to make an initial purchase, and this leads investors to question the ability 
of AgTech startups to grow a paying customer base. This is an especially challenging combination of issues 
for a startup with a yet-to-be-proven product, as is the case for most Indian AgTech startups.65 Farmers need 
to be confident that AgTech will work and believe that AgTech applications or data can be trusted, are 
accurate, and that actions taken based on the offered technology solution will produce anticipated results.  
 
Coupled with these uncertainties, smallholder farmers are also risk-adverse customers. Farming is a 
complex process that requires a series of multiple, interlinked steps and stages, all of which must succeed 
for the crop to be harvested and sold. One error made at one step can ruin the whole venture, even if all the 
other steps are “good.” This risk-adverse dynamic is further complicated because farming errors can result 
from unobservable phenomena.66 Because many smallholder farmers live on a thin margin that determines 
whether or not they survive, engaging in a rational and objective risk assessment for the potential adoption 
of a new on-farm technology is complicated. 
  
As subjects of these interrelated complexities, farmers are different from mainstream tech consumers in 
other sectors in which the cost-risk benefit calculus is more straightforward. When a farmer’s risk-averse 
tendencies are combined with low technological literacy, as indicated by a smartphone penetration of 
roughly 25%, and when farmers only “have a basic sense of understanding about digital marketplaces,”67 the 
task to convince them to become a startup customer is evident to the investor: farmers are a more risky and 
less profitable potential customer than those in other sectors would be. 
 
These are some reasons why the agricultural sector is among those least affected by digital technology. A 
2017 World Bank study of about 80 startups in four different national startup ecosystems found that less 
than 5% of respondents thought the agricultural sector had been a primary beneficiary of digital technology 









64 Sachitanand, 2018.  
65 Tongia, 2019. 
66 Ward, Patrick and Vartika Singh.  “Risk and Ambiguity Preferences and the Adoption of New Agricultural 
Technologies: Evidence from Field Experiments in Rural India.” IFPRI Discussion Paper 01324, February 2014, p. 1. 
67 D’Cunha, Suparna Dutt. “For India’s Farmers It’s AgTech Startups, Not Government, That Is Key.” Forbes, Jan. 08, 2018.  
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Gap in Understanding Between Startups and Farmers  
 
We have talked to more than 40 drone companies purporting to do something in the ag space, 
yet we have not invested in any. We are not convinced that any of them have the right formula 
for delivering value to the actual farmer. We see too many tech centric, rather than user centric, 
approaches. 69 
Technology Acceleration Partners Blog, 2018 
 
Many [startup] founders just do not have the feel for and understanding of the farmer’s needs. 
Farmers as a segment are highly varied—different crops, different ages, different farm size[s], 
different countries and different acceptance of technologies.70  
Daniel Aminetzah, McKinsey, 2019 
 
The vast majority of Indian investors, particularly the big venture-capital funded ones, are urban 
centric. They have founders with urban backgrounds, they cater to urban demand, and are 
overwhelmingly copycats of solutions to urban problems from other, typically Western countries.71 
Rahul Sachitanand, The Economic Times, 2018 
 
These observations reflect the gaps between what AgTech startups think and what farmers think; between 





68 World Bank, 2017 
69 Technology Acceleration Partners.  “Why Precision Ag Has Been Slow to Take Root.” Overland Park, Kansas: 
Technology Acceleration Partners, 2018. 
70 Daniel Aminetzah as quoted in Donald Marvin, “Most Startups Fail. How Can AgTech Startups Defy The Odds?” Forbes, 
February 25, 2019. 
71 Sachitanand, 2018. 









customers and the willingness of a farmer to become that customer. Given the added challenge created by 
a lack of capital, any question farmers may have about being able to rely on what AgTech startups claim, or 
an outright distrust of them, makes recruiting farmers as customers even more difficult. 
 
 
Farmers Are Slow Technology Adopters 
 
Farmers are considered slow adopters. They are now being overwhelmed by offerings. It ’s not just 
about how good is your solution. It’s also about your ability to get their attention and their 
willingness to pay, especially when they are struggling.72 
Daniel Aminetzah, McKinsey, 2019 
 
Farmers aren’t conservative adopters of purported solutions just because they’re stubborn. 
They’re conservative because every growing season is a high stakes game of chance in which a 
host of variables interact in ways that can’t always be predicted. 73 
TechAccel Blog, 2018 
 
Convincing farmers to apply technology to farming practices is difficult. They are not willing to 
make an investment, as there’s a lack of trust. 74  
Suvankar Mishra, co-founder of eKutir, 2018 
 
 
Farmers will take time to develop full trust in AgTech technologies75 
NASSCOM, 2018 
 
These investor, analyst, and startup observations are supported by research that finds that farmers, and 
smallholder farmers are, in particular, reluctant adopters of new technology.76,77,78  While reluctant, some 
farmers do adopt some new digital technologies. A larger, and perhaps more important, question may be 
why do, in some cases, a sufficiently large number of farmers adopt a technology that triggers a dramatic, 
digital-technology-aided impact and, in other cases, they do not?  
One example of successful AgTech adoption is mobile phone adoption in the fish supply chain reported by 
Jensen.79 The benefits of such adoption include higher prices for fishermen, less price dispersion, less 
spoilage, and reduced costs for the consumer. A difference between this case and many other current 
startup AgTech solutions is that the digital technology was the mobile phone, and most people, even those 
without a mobile device, could understand what a phone call or text were. As such, potential consumers 





72 Marvin, 2019.  
73 Technology Acceleration Partners, 2018.  
74 D’Cunha, 2019. 
75 NASSCOM, 2018, p. 27. 
76 Ward and Singh, 2014. 
77 Langat, B. K., V.K. Ngéno, P.M, Nyangweso, M. J. Mutwol, M. J. Kipsat, L. Gohole & S. Yaninek. Drivers of Technology 
Adoption in a Subsistence Economy: The case of Tissue Culture Bananas in Western Kenya. Invited paper presented at 
the 4th International Conference of the African of Agricultural Economists, September 22-25, 2013, Hammamet, Tunisia, 
2013. 
78 Yigezu, Yigezu Atnafe et al. “Enhancing adoption of agricultural technologies requiring high initial investment among 
smallholders.” Technological Forecasting & Social Change Volume 134, 2018. 
79 Jensen, Robert. “The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Market Performance, and Welfare in the South Indian 
Fisheries Sector.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 122, Issue 3, August 2007, 
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provide. Another example of digital technology moving to scale is mobile money; however, the risk 
assessment associated with adopting mobile money is relatively easy to calculate compared to other 
AgTech solutions; however, even the most successful mobile money company, mPesa, took more than 15 
years to go to scale and did so in the wake of civil violence that increased the risk for potential customers 
venturing far away from home.  
 
Another reason farmer AgTech uptake is slow is the mismatch between the cost of the AgTech and what a 
farmer is able or willing to pay, even when a risk and cost-benefit calculation can be adequately made. For 
smallholder farmers, the purchase of more expensive AgTech solutions, such as mechanization or high cost 
digital technology devices and applications, are currently cost prohibitive.80,81 
 
Poor results or bad previous experiences farmers have had with AgTech solutions as well as mismatches 
between the skills required to use or understand a new technology82 also undermine greater or faster 
AgTech adoption. One such an example is a soil health-testing program that required farmers to analyze a 
chart with soil pH, electrical conductivity, and organic carbon: Vartika Singh and Sujata Ganguly report that 
all three charts “were unintelligible to many farmers, even when presented in the local language.” 83 Avinash 
Kishore, an IFPRI researcher in New Delhi noted:  
 
Tests are often poorly done and farmers know it. Even when the test is done well, we [agricultural 
scientists] translate test results into recommendations in ways that do not align with farmers’ 
interests.84  
 
Kishore also attributes the lack of farmer technology adoption to the availability of subsidies that encourage 
“companies to add unnecessary bells and whistles to a product instead of developing cheaper versions of 
it,” which stifles innovation85 and makes these products or services more costly.  
 
The reason that slow smallholder farmers’ adoption of AgTech is important in India is that so much of the 
Indian agricultural sector consists of smallholder farmers. Nearly 40% of arable land is small farms of less 

















80 NASCOM, 2018, p. 27, 
81 Committee on Doubling Farmers’ Income.  Report of the Committee on Doubling Farmers’ Income. Volume XI 
“Empowering the Farmers through Extension and Knowledge Dissemination.” November 2017, p. 60. 
82 NASCOM, 2018, p. 27. 
83 Singh, Vartika and Sujata Ganguly. “Designing a better Soil Health Card for farmers in India.” IFPRI Blog, March 19, 
2018. 
84 Kishore, Avinash. “Why farmers in India adopt certain technologies but ignore others.” IFPRI Blog, July 6, 2018. 
85 Kishore, 2018. 
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Based the growth in small farm landholding in India, any innovation that can boost smallholder farmer 
productivity or profitability can have a dramatic impact. This demographic represents an increasingly 
greater proportion of farmers—but with important caveats. Startups targeting those farmers who are 
farming less than 2 hectares are looking at potential customers who generate nearly 50% of their household 
income revenue from non-farm activities and who carry a greater amount of debt than other farmers (see 
Chart 9). As potential customers, these farmers will be less able to generate benefits from AgTech solutions 
than those who generate more income from on-farm activities. When debt levels are factored into on-farm 
to off-farm revenue ratios, a small farm farmer may be less attractiveness as a potential customer based on 







86 Calculated from the Committee on Doubling Farmers’ Income.  Committee on Doubling Farmers’ Income Volume I 
“March of Agriculture since Independence and Growth Trends.” August 2017, p. 12. 
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Key Finding 3: Three challenges: low investment, understanding gaps, slow tech adoption  
 
Three key challenges inhibiting Indian startups’ transition to scale are: (1) the lack of investment finance for 
AgTech startups; (2) significantly different understanding among AgTech startups, farmers, and investors 
about the utility of AgTech, how AgTech can help farmers generate more revenue, and how AgTech 
startups can be profitable; and that (3) farmers, and in particular smallholder farmers, are slow adopters of 
AgTech solutions. These three challenges are inter-related and mutually reinforcing and, together, 
compound the magnitude of the overall challenges startups need to resolve to transition to scale.  
 
 
3.5 Future Opportunities for AgTech 
 
Given the challenges and dynamics outlined in the previous sections, a forward-looking assessment of 
future AgTech opportunities is useful. Two such forecasts can be found in the Committee to Double Farmers’ 
Income recommendations88 and a McKinsey analysis of investment opportunities in the agricultural sector.89  
 
The broad-based conclusion of the Committee to Double Farmers’ Income is that Indian farmers can 





87 Table Sources: % Debt is from Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2018. Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture & 
Farmers Welfare, 2019, p. 383. Household income is from Thiagu Ranganathan, “Farmers’ Income in India: evidence from 
secondary data.”  Agricultural Economics Research Unit, Institute of Economic Growth: New Delhi , India, Undated, p. 34.  
88 Committee to Double Farmers Income, Vol. 14, p. 60. 
89 Goyal, Avinash, Chandrika Rajagopalan, Lutz Goedde, and Nitika Nathani. 2017. “Harvesting golden opportunities in 
Indian agriculture: from food security to farmers’ income security by 2025.” McKinsey, July 2017. 
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improving their productivity, or moving to non-farm occupations.90 Within this context, the Committee to 
Double Farmers’ Income specifies seven digital technologies that could be adopted to support increases in 
farmers’ income; however, among these, only one – precision agriculture – is clearly an on-farm technology.91 
This off-farm centric trend is broadly consistent with McKinsey’s analysis of seven future priority agricultural 
investment sectors,92 which only includes one on-farm digital technology: farm digital analytics.93  
 
The inability of Indian AgTech to contribute to smallholder farmers’ productivity or profitability is important 
because of the quantity of smallholder farmers in the country and the amount of land they farm. According 
to the Committee to Double Farmer’s Income, “small” (1>2 ha.) and “marginal” (>1 ha.) farms accounted for 
39% of total farmland in 2010, an increase of 42% between 1995 and 2010.94 By contrast, in 2010, large farm 









4 Hyderabad AgTech Ecosystem Case 
Study 
 
This section provides a micro-level perspective of the digital agriculture ecosystem in and around 
Hyderabad, based on results from a survey of Hyderabad-based AgTech startups and investors. In 
September and October 2019, a self-administered,web-based survey of 42 investors and startups was 
implemented by Thought Folks, a Hyderabad research organization. This was followed up with 40 in-depth 
interviews of individuals from that same pool of survey respondents. 
 
These numbers may seem low, but the market research firm Traxcn estimates that, by the end of 2019, there 
were 35 AgTech startups based in Hyderabad. The 21-respondent survey sample, thus, represents about 60% 





90 Perhaps recognizing that nearly half of the poorest farmers’ household incomes is derived from off-farm activities, the 
Committee on Doubling Farmers’ Income also notes a shift to non-farm activities.  
91 It is noteworthy that the Committee to Double Farmers’ Income highlights education and the importance of digital 
skills development needed for farmers to take advantage of and become competent in the use of digital technology. 
Committee on Doubling Farmers’ Income. Report of the Committee on Doubling Farmers’ Income, Volume XIV, 
“Comprehensive Policy Recommendations.” September 2018, p. 60. 
92 McKinsey. “India as an agriculture and high value food powerhouse: A new vision for 2030.” McKinsey, 2013. 
93  McKinsey, 2013. 
94 Committee on Doubling Farmers’ Income, Volume I, 2017, p. 12.   
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website, but there were no AgTech investments in their portfolios.95  Angel.Co reported 50 Telangana-based 
investors, of whom 24 had made some sort of an investment by 2019.96 In addition, Traxcn reports that of the 
30 VC firms located in Hyderabad in mid-2019,97 only two focused on the AgTech space. Given these 
estimates, a sample of 21 investors would represent a minimum of 25% of the AgTech investor population 
around Hyderabad.  
 
The survey focused on quantifiable results, such as whether a startup entrepreneur was involved in their first 
startup; whether they had received an investment or not; whether they had met with an investor in the last 
12 months, and the stage of development in which they currently were. Investors were asked how many 
AgTech and non-AgTech investments deals they had made and how much they had invested. Startups and 
investors were asked a set of similar questions, focusing on what they thought were the most valuable 
startup success factors and what changes they would make to the ecosystem to better facilitate startups’ 
transitions to scale. This approach was designed to help generate a profile of both investors and startups 
and to compare the similarity of startups’ and investors’ views on key success factors.  
 
 
4.1 Hyderabad Overview 
 
Hyderabad is the capital of Telegana, a state considered to be one of the most technologically advanced 
regions in India. There are 27 technology incubators in Hyderabad, four of which specialize in agriculture. 
Most notably among these are the iHub, based at the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) of the CGIAR consortium, and the aIDEA Incubator, run by the Association for 
Innovation Development of Entrepreneurship based at the National Academy of Agricultural Research 
Management. In 2018, Hyderabad was home to about 3,000 startups, which represented roughly 15% of the 
20,000 Indian startups active that year.98 The city has the largest incubator in India – T Hub – which, at the 
end of 2019, supported 200 startups. It is expected to expand such that it will be able to accommodate 1,000 
startups by 2022. In addition to this thriving startup sector, many large international technology 




4.2 Hyderabad AgTech Ecosystem Results 
 
AgTech Startup Profile 
 
The Hyderabad AgTech startup ecosystem is in the initial development stage with most startup founders 
working on their first startup, as reported in Chart 10. Few startups have progressed beyond the product 
validation stage of development and most founders said they had not met with an investor in the 12 months 
prior to the survey, and less than 40 percent reported having obtained some investment of any kind. More 
than a third said they have other work responsibilities, making their startup only one of the many demands 
on their time. And about 90 percent said they are involved only with their own startup. These results are 





95 “Investor Listing Page.” Hyderabad Angels, 2020. 
96 Angel.Co. “Telangana Angel Investors. Angel Co., 2020. 
97 Tracxn. “Venture Capital Funds in Hyderabad.” Tracxn, 2020. 
98 Iyer, Rama. “The Future Startup Capital of India.” CFO Insights, Undated 
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Chart 10: Hyderabad AgTech Startup  
Founder Profile  
 
 
Chart 11: Percent of startups with investment and 
that met investors in past 12 months 
 
 
These findings suggest the AgTech startup ecosystem around Hyderabad remains in the early
development stage. This is consistent with the results reported in Chart 12, which shows that between 2016 
and 2019, the AgTech startups surveyed have undergone modest changes with a few reporting that their 
company has reached the growth stage. 
 






Key Finding 4: Most startups are at an initial development stage   
 
Most Indian AgTech startups are just beginning to engage with customers and validate their products, 
with only a few at or beginning to transition to scale. 
 
 
AgTech Investment Profile 
 
The types of investors that have invested in AgTech startups in our sample, as well as the amount and 
number of investments they have made, are reported in Table 1. The table reveals that, among 11 invesments 
made in the eight AgTech startups in the sample, only two were made by venture capital (VC) investors, with 
the balance of nine investments made by social, angel, or grant investors.  
Table 1: Hyderabad AgTech Investment Profile  
 
Startup Investor Type 
Number of  




1 Incubator Accelerator 1  US$       0- 20k 
2 Donor Grant  2  US$ 100k-500k 
3 Social Impact  3  US$   20k-100k 
4 Angel Investor   US$   20k-100k 
5 Angel Investor 3  US$ 100k-500k 
6 Angel Investor & Social Impact    US$ 100k-500k 
7 Institutional VC & Social Impact  
2 
 US$   20k-100k 
8 
Institutional VC & Gov. of India 
Grant 
 US$ 100k-500k 
 
Noteworthy is that the two startups with VC funding had previously received grant or social impact funding, 
which suggests that these sources of funding are important precursors to securing VC funding. These results 
strongly suggest that the availability of startup AgTech investment in Hyderabad is extremely limited and 
that the Hyderabad AgTech startup ecosystem is still developing. This is important for a startup’s transition 




If a startup is based out of a mature ecosystem -- for example, Silicon Valley or maybe Bangalore 
or Delhi--, their chance of success is higher because they often get better opportunities for 
funding because the local ecosystem actually matters. 
 
The propensity of Hyderabad-based investors to invest in the AgTech sector compared to non-AgTech 
sectors is shown in Chart 13. Slightly less than 40% of investors report they have invested in AgTech startups 
(5 of 13). That the AgTech sector is unattractive to investors is clearly reflected in the proportion of total 
investments in AgTech: investors made slightly more than 10% of their investment deals in AgTech (18 of 167 
investments). This suggests that while Hyderabad investors are willing to invest in AgTech, they have found 
it more attractive to invest in other sectors. This result is consistent with the significant preference for non-
AgTech investments noted in the India Landscape Study. Investors’ reluctance to invest in AgTech may be 
partially due to the difficulty associated with generating profit, bridging skill and understanding gaps, and 
because potential consumers are reluctant to adopt and pay for AgTech.  
 
Investor and startup views on the Indian AgTech startup system in comparison to other sectors are shown 
in Chart 14. There is a clear, if not overwhelming, tendency for both startups and investors to view the AgTech 
sector as being different from other sectors. The responses from startups approach unanimity on this 
question with nearly 80 % of investors agreeing with them.  
 
  
Key Finding 5: Public interest organization investments are important 
 
Most AgTech startup investments have been made by non-commercial investors. Commercial, for-profit 
investors are much more likely to invest in non-AgTech startup ventures, but there are a few notable 
exceptions. This underscores the importance of public interest organizations in the investment 
ecosystem. Without these types of extra-market investments, AgTech startups’ transitions to scale will 





Accelerating startup transition to scale 
 
A key challenge for both AgTech investors and startups is knowing what key success factors can 
accelerate startups in their transitions to scale. To understand better what Hyderabad-based startups 
and investors think about startup key success factors, respondents were asked two questions. The first 
asked respondents to choose the three most important success factors startups need to transition to 
scale99 in 2016 and 2019. The second question was what three changes to the startup ecosystem a 
respondent would make to help startups make the transition to scale more quickly. Results from these 
questions are presented in charts 15, 16, and 17.  
 
Startups’ most valued key success factors in 2016 and 2019 are shown in Chart 15. In 2019, the startups’ 
most valued success factors were business capacity (with 67% of startup entrepreneurs making this 
selection) and access to finance (with 62% of startups making this selection). The importance of these 
success factors more than doubled between 2016 and 2019, as shown in Chart 15. In contrast, success 
factors such as technical skills, completed minimum viable product, and access to infrastructure were 
relatively less valued in 2019 than were business capacity and access to finance, but these did increase 
slightly in absolute value since 2016. 
 
The differences between the investors’ and startups’ evaluation of the six key success factors in 2019 are 
shown in Chart 16. Results reveal that investors and startup entrepreneurs were generally aligned on the 
importance of the key success factors. While more startups valued business capacity (67%) and access to 
finance (62%) than investors, investors placed a greater value on technical skills (57%) and completed 
minimum viable product (48%). Access to infrastrucutre has the lowest rating as a key success factor, 






99 Respondents were asked which three key success factors among six possible options were most important. The six 
key success factors used for this survey were those identified by the World Bank in 2017 as important for startups.  
Chart 15: Hyderabad Startup Key Success Factors, 





Chart 16: Hyderabad startup and investor  startup 
succcess factors, 2019 
 
 
(% noted in the charts are for 2019) 
 
Chart 17 presents a comparison of investor and startups rankings of the six key success factors in 2016 
and 2019. Although startups’  and investors’ rankings were fairly closely aligned in 2019, as shown in Chart 
17, there were some dramatic changes in how startups ranked the key success factors from 2016 to 2019.   
 
Between 2016 and 2019, the number of startups that ranked business capacity and access to finance as 
key success factors increased dramatically, by 133% and 85%, respectively, compared to modest investor 
ranking increases of 10% and 14%, respectively. Reflecting a common trend, between 2016 and 2019 both 
investors’ and startups’ rankings of market intelligence and technical skills as key success factors 
increased: market intelligence by 25% and 5% and technical skills by 11% and 19% for startups and 
investors, respectively. 
 
However, startup entrepreneurs and investors diverged in their rankings of the importance of a 
completed minimum viable product and access to infrastucture. Between 2016 and 2019, startups’ 
ranking of the importance of a complete minimum viable product increased by 33% and investor ranking 
decreased by 24%. Startups’ ranking of access to infastructure increased by 17% while the investor ranking 
decreased by 19% between polling periods. 






Charts 15, 16, and 17 suggest that increasing the early stage startup’s business capacity, including 
providing access to finance, would help support it in a more successful transition to scale. This finding is 
consistent with a 2017 World Bank study of key success factors among startup entrepreneurs in Armenia, 
Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa.100 
 
Between 2016 and 2019, startups changed their ranking of the importance of key success factors, as 
shown in Chart 17. Chart 16 shows this change brought them into better alignment with investor rankings 
in 2019. From 2016 to 2019, the number of startups valuing business capacity and access to finance 
increased by 133% and 85%, as shown in Chart 18, while the number of investors valuing both only 
increased by 10% and 14%, respectively. On the other hand, investors’ and startups’ opinions of some other 
success factors shifted in opposite directions. The number of startups valuing complete minimum viable 
product increased by 17% and 33% from 2016 to 2019 and the number of investors valuing this same factor 
decreased by 19% and 24% in the same periods. These types of shifts result in closer alignment between 
investors’ and startups’ valuation of key success factors, as reflected in the modest differences seen in 
Chart 16. 
 
The most important changes in the AgTech startup ecosystem that startups and investors could make 
to facilitate accelerating startups’ transitions to scale is reported in charts 18a and 18b. Respondents were 
asked to choose three possible changes from among the 10 options presented. These results show the 
areas startups and investors think are the most inhibiting for a startup in making the transition to scale 
and also provides a basis for comparing startups’ and investors’ rankings. 
 
Charts 18a and 18b report the same results, but differ in how each of the 10 changes are clustered. Chart 
18a shows priority changes in three areas: government policy, market access, and access to technology. 
Chart 18b reports on investor-startup concurance or divergence of the priority of each ecosystem change. 
Results from Chart 18a inform general priority areas for change while results from Chart 18b identify 
where investors and startups agree or do not agree, and the extent of their agreement or disagreement, 





100 World Bank, 2017. 
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Chart 18a: Thematic clusters—changes in the AgTech ecosystem to make it more supportive of startups’ transitions 
to scale 
 
Comparatively, both investors and startups thought better access to rural customers was the most 
important change needed to make the ecosystem more supportive of a startup’s transition to scale,101 
although nearly twice as many startups placed this as a priority. Investors rated greater access to 
smartphones, more use of digital social media networks, and better access to rural customers as equally 
important. Startups largely concurred with investors on the importance of access to smartphones; 
however, the two groups diverged significantly with respect to their opinions on the importance of digital 
social media. Both investors and startups concurred that greater access to PCs and laptops was the least 
important of the possible changes neecessary to move the needle on startups’ transitions to scale.  
 
Chart 18a also reveals there is less consensus among startups than investors about which ecosystem 
changes should be priorities, as indicated by the greater dispersion of startup percentages, ranging from 
5% to 62% , while the dispersion among investors was less, ranging from 14% to 38%.  
 
The same data in Chart 18a is shown in Chart 18b, but results are presented according to the level of  
investor and startup concurrance with the priority of each change.102 The top four bars indicate relative 
concurrence between investors and startups with differences of 0% to 5% and the bottom six bars reflect 
more divergence of opinion, with differences of between 10% to 24% (in absolute value). Table 18b 
identifies where investors and startups have different priorities for  the ecosystem to become more 





101 The first number is for investors and the second for startups. 
102 This is calculated as the difference between the percentage of startups and investors who selected the change as 
a priority and is reported to the left of the y axis and labled as ∆%. 
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Chart 18b: Investor-Startup concurrence on the priority of changes to the startup ecosystem needed to make it 
more supportive of startups’ transitions to scale 
 
 
Key Finding 6: Understanding gap between startups and investors may be closing 
 
Survey results indicate that the gap in understanding between startups and investors, noted in Key 
Finding 3, may be closing. Differences in the valuation of key success factors for AgTech startups were 





5 Core Ecosystem Dynamics: 
Synthesizing Micro and Macro 
Perspectives  
 
A synthesis of the findings in the India landscape review and the Hyderabad case study finds that there 
are five core dynamics that negatively affect startups’ abilities to achieve profitability and to transition to 
scale. The following section presents how each dynamic may impede a startup’s transition to scale in the 
context of each dynamic, how the dynamics interact with others, and how these interactions engender 
and perpetuate systemic challenges. This is followed by a more in-depth discussion of the implications 
of these findings.  
  
One dynamic is the (1) economic reality of agricultural economies in India: most farmers are poor, 
operate in highly localized economic environments, and are subject to widespread AgTech illiteracy.  
 
This leads to (2) a lack of investment since most Indian farmers cannot afford AgTech today and are 
unlikely to be AgTech customers. This dynamic is compounded by the market reality that there are other 
more attractive and profitable sectors than AgTech for both startups and investors to focus on, and this 
is the space they tend to fill.  
 
These two dynamics directly contribute to the (3) slower adoption of AgTech, which, in turn, reinforces 
the lack of investment.  
 
Each of these three dynamics contributes to (4) a lack of data about the AgTech startup ecosystem. 
Inadequate data has at least two major consequences. First, inadequate data results in low problem 
definition, or the inability to define the problem(s) precisely enough for viable solutions to be developed; 
if the problem cannot be defined it cannot be solved. Second, if there is low problem definition, the 
startup cannot answer investors’ questions satisfactorily or gain farmers’ confidence that the startup’s 
proposed solution–whether it is to increase the farmer’s crop yield, sell them, or increase their profits--
can actually be delivered.  
 
Inadequate data is partially due to the genuine difficulty and expense of collecting actionable agricultural 
data, farm-level data in particular. This is because the volume of data required to generate actionable 
solutions is quite large and expensive.  
 
A lack of data undermines a startup’s ability to develop and articulate accurate strategies for customer 
acquisition, which contributes to lower investment and lower adoption rates. The economic reality of 
agricultural economies is that the venture of farming and bringing in the crop is based on a range of 
interdependent and often unpredictable factors. Therefore, solving one problem may not ultimately 
make any difference in farm productivity or farmers’ livelihoods. This too drives up the volume of data 
required to make broad-based actionable solutions. A result is that investors are much less likely to invest 
in the AgTech sector.  
 
These dynamics contribute to the reality that the (5) AgTech ecosystem is in the initial development 
phase as most Indian-based AgTech startups are, as of this writing.  
 
Taken in sum, these dynamics undermine the potential of startup entrepreneurs to transition to scale. 
The five dynamics are intertwined and reinforce each other in multiple ways across a range of scenarios. 
Some pairs of dynamics appear to be particularly mutually reinforcing, which merits further discussion 
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in order to develop a better understanding of how these dynamics interact and how to mitigate their 
impact. By developing this understanding, a better definition of the potential paths for startups to 
accelerate their transitions to scale can be created.  
 
In the balance of this section, the discussion of how each dynamic impedes a startup’s transition to scale 
is made in the context of interview results of Hyderabad-based investors and startups and the landscape 
review. The discussion relies heavily on the actual words voiced by investors, startups, and analysts, which 
are noted in offset italics. 
 
 
5.1 Economic Reality of Agriculture Economies  
 
A majority of Indian farmers are poor and operate in a complex food system in which bringing in their 
crops, feeding their families, and making some additional money are based on a multitude of 
solutions nested within a range of interlinked problems. Most farmers also operate in economies that 
are highly localized and in agricultural practices and behaviors that are rooted in local customs and 
cultures. Consequently, Indian agricultural economies are varied and contextual. This means that 
issues of trust and personalization play a big role in how the agricultural economy functions. These 
layers of heterogeneity pose challenges for those AgTech startups looking for standard and 
homogenous solutions, ones that can work uniformly across different customer categories.  
 
While there may be significant differences among smallholder farmers,103 they are alike in that they are 
poor and most of them cannot afford much of anything, let alone AgTech. Farmers on small and marginal 
farms generate about half of their incomes from off-farm activities and about half of them are in debt. In 
comparison, farmers on larger farms generate nearly 70% of their incomes from on-farm activities and 
only 20% are in debt (see Chart 9). This suggests that smallholder farms are much less attractive 
prospective customers for AgTech startups than are larger farms. As one startup noted:  
 
In India, agriculture is done by crores [hundreds of millions] of people and all those people 
have small land holdings. Therefore, for me, he is my potential end user, but he is not my 
customer. I can’t reach him. Neither of us can reach each other. Neither he me, nor me him. 
And he can’t pay me. So, my solution won’t work for him if he is a small landholder. 
 
In the same vein, an investor argued:  
 
Lots of good startups are developing solutions for farmers, but they do not know who is going 
to pay. The farmer is not going to pay. The land holding is very small, and they are not in a 
position to pay 
 
And, another startup made the same argument, but adds that a lack of technology literacy further 
complicates matters: 
 





103 The India Committee to Double Farmers’ Income uses a common definition for smallholder farmers as those with 
between 1 and 2 hectares of land. It defines marginal farmers as those with less than 1 hectare. Medium and large 




These comments and others affirm the view that smallholder farmers are less interesting customers for 
startups than are potential customers in other market segments. 
 
 
5.2 Lack of finance in the AgTech ecosystem  
 
Many AgTech ecosystem commentators and researchers note that there is very little AgTech investment; 
our survey and interview results confirm this observation. AgTech startups suffer from an inability to 
generate adequate investment, especially from profit-oriented investors. In fact, some investors see the 
AgTech sector as a non-commercial domain, as one investor noted:  
 
I have not invested in AgTech, but have met at least 10-15 startup entrepreneurs and [their 
products and services] are social innovations and cannot be commercialized easily.  
 
A widely-held perception among many analysts and respondents is succinctly stated by one startup:  
 
[We] may be solving great problems, doing great things, and scaling it up, but when will we 
make money?  
 
The lack of investment may be largely a result of the economic reality of agricultural economies, but there 
are other reasons, too. Investors, for example, commonly think startups are not addressing the 
fundamental business issues present in AgTech. As one investor observed:  
 
Many people in agri tech don’t have an answer to [two key] questions: Who is the paying 
customer? How [is the startup] going to get paying customers? 
 
An additional challenge for the startup seeking an investor is that even if it can project profitability, the 
profit may not be sufficient to attract an investor. As one investor noted:  
 
It's easy to achieve success in the initial stage, but ensuring a continuous growth rate of 10% or 
20%/month is not easy. And, unless that happens, investors don’t get their wanted return on 
investment. … So even a business that is/might be successful cannot always achieve this 
standard. 
 
Another investor put the same message forward in a different way, saying that he and other investors 
want: 
 
Profitability at every level; they need to demonstrate this and an ability to raise multiple 
rounds of funding. 
 
Yet another investor, who was perhaps a little more sympathetic, said:  
 
In some cases, it becomes a chicken and egg issue: the challenge is that without revenue, they 
won’t get investment and without investment, they won’t get revenue.  
 
The inability of startup entrepreneurs to clearly articulate their business cases to potential investors may 
reflect the complexity of the AgTech market itself or the aptitude of the startup to gather and present 
data related to their business case. As one investor observed: 
 
Startups can’t size their market properly because they are working with a bunch of sub-scale 
producers. They underestimate the logistic effort [required] to collect, grade, deliver, [and] 






5.3  Slow rate of AgTech adoption 
 
Unquestionably, the economic reality of agricultural economies and the ensuing lack of investment 
influences the rate of AgTech adoption. However, there are other significant user adoption issues to be 
managed as well. Illiteracy, of both the written word and of technology, is important. As one respondent 
noted: 
 
We are dealing with a farmer who has just started to understand a smartphone while startups 
in other sectors have customers with access to and years of experience with smartphone 
technology.  
 
Illiteracy issues, particularly technological illiteracy, mean that the solutions proposed by AgTech startups 
are not as easily or readily adopted by farmers, nor are the solutions used as fluently, especially by 
smallholder farmers. As one investor stated:  
 
With farmers you have to prove [the efficacy of the solution] again and again, where as in 
other sectors, once proven, the proof has some legs with customers.  
 
Farmer reticence to accept and replicate successful AgTech results that occur in other places is likely 
partially due to the heterogeneous layers of the agricultural economies, as previously discussed. Startups 
seeking to market the same product in a lowest common denominator approach may often fall victim 
to the peculiarities of local circumstances. At the same time, tailoring a product to the peculiarities of 
local circumstances reduces the potential market size and, thus, increases the customer acquisition cost. 
 
Marketing a product in a lowest common denominator approach does not sufficiently take into account 
local circumstances. This may, as one respondent warned, ensure that; 
 
The relevance of technology to farmers’ needs is often overlooked.  
 
Not surprisingly, smallholder farmers tend not to be early paying adopters in the nascent AgTech 
ecosystem. Aside from the inherent dynamic of poor people being less attractive customers, some 
respondents and analysts noted that government subsidies provide what are essentially no-cost services 
or goods. This practice can distort the market and undermine the ability of startups to capture a farmer-
customer base of a sufficiently large size to be commercially sustainable. As one startup entrepreneur 
noted:  
 
Most of the AgTech [startups] who are into [the] forecasting business (e.g. weather, crop, or 
price) do directly impact the farmer, but none of them get revenue from the farmer. It’s all paid 
by the government and government policies, food & commodity markets, or others.  
 
 
5.4 Lack of data about the AgTech Sector 
 
A key theme among respondents and other observers is that the lack of data about the AgTech 
ecosystem impedes a startup’s transition to scale. With inadequate data about AgTech consumers, 
farmers, their suppliers, aggregators, processors, and marketers, among others, viably investable 
business cases are difficult, if not impossible, to develop. The following two mutually reinforcing issues 
impede more AgTech sector data collection.  
 
First, with multiple economic and market locations, data may need to be collected for many individual 
locations for that data to have widespread applicability. This makes data collection more difficult and 
more expensive to collect than it would be for a more homogeneous population, where a single sample 
might effectively serve the whole population. However, because most farmers operate in highly localized 
markets and have practices rooted in local customs and cultures, they are a very heterogeneous group. 
This means there are many more groups to sample, which is a more significant data collection effort that 




Second, independent of the data collection costs, increasing the number of market samples required to 
generate actionable data for AgTech dilutes the relative value of the data for any single market sample 
since the data gathered only applies to a smaller market. Data gathered to facilitate customer acquisition 
for a startup catering to rice farmers in Andhra Pradesh, for example, may not be applicable to rice 
farmers in Maharashtra, given the dramatic difference in their rice yields. When highly fractionalized 
market segments exist, actionable data needs to be context specific; however, this results in fewer 
potential paying users, which makes the data less valuable.   
 
Both issues contribute to relatively less data collection and leads to more and larger data gaps. Not only 
is AgTech sector data more expensive to collect, but it is also worth less than data from other sectors. 
 
A number of startup and investor respondents and analysts commented on a general data gap in the 
agricultural sector and observed that it is especially pronounced in the AgTech market. This conclusion 
is clearly reflected in comments from two startups entrepreneurs:  
 
Data on which farmer is growing which crop, or what is the exact productive areas of the crop 
being grown, the irrigation area region is a mess.  
 
In other sectors, there is good data on the profile of the end consumer. Facebook, LinkedIn, 
telephone operators. This can generate good profile data of prospective customers. It is 
difficult for AgTech startups if they do not have this kind of data on their customers, especially 
when it comes to the initial design and pitch to prospective customers. The customer profile 
database is most important. Very few AgTech startups have access to good customer profile 
data even through third-party data vendors. This lack of data is a big limitation for AgTech 
and that is not the case for startups in other sectors. 
 
Market data is fundamental for startup success in any sector and nowhere is a lack of data so clearly 
a deal breaker for investors as when investors want to know:  
 
What is the size of the market and how can startups effectively target that market? 
Without this knowledge, startups won’t be able to scale.  
 
More fundementally, as another startup entrepreneur noted:  
 
It is all about lack of data, as without data, there cannot be too many proven models and, 
without data for farmers, what can help them make a better profit? 
 
The lack of data has two corollary issues that seriously undermine the ability of more startups to transition 
to scale and to do so faster, which merit a more detailed discussion. First, lack of data contributes to low 
problem definition and the inability for many startups to adequately define the problem they will solve 
and whether it will generate results. Second, lack of data contributes to understanding gaps between 
startups and investors and between startups and farmers. 
 
a. Low Problem Definition 
 
Solutions that AgTech startups provide are often insufficiently defined in the broader context of how their 
solutions can increase crop production or household income. This is due to the food system’s complexity, 
in which any one or two solutions are nested within a complex of multiple, linked challenges. As 
characterized by one investor:  
 
Farmers have hundreds of problems. Which one is the startup solving and how will it increase 
the customer’s revenue and profit? 
 




In other ecosystems, if something goes wrong, you can recover by a tweak, reworking and 
building success. But in AgTech, [success] depends on the agricultural cycles and various other 
factors you don’t have control over. 
 
The issue here, as the two investors note, is that farmers face many challenges and assessing whether 
solving one (and perhaps not the other) will contribute positively to their overall productivity. This 
requires a volume of data that is currently unavailable to adequately estimate whether solving “the 
problem” will help the farmer bring in the crop, sell it at a higher price, and increase his or her household 
income. Given the complexity of a multitude of independent variables, defining a problem and proposing 
a solution requires much more data than is currently available. Consider one investor’s observation of the 
complexity of issues that AgTech startups face:  
 
In other startup sectors, you satisfy a specific need, e.g. Umber/Ola, they satisfy the need for 
transportation. Pat takes care of only payments. In AgTech, there is no such very, very specific 
need. For example, if a startup solves the hyper local weather problem for a farmer, will [the 
farmer] pay for the data? I doubt it. If you solve the pest and disease problem, the farmer won’t 
pay for it. That alone will not clearly increase his confidence enough that solving this problem 
will increase profitability. The farmer will pay when you are able to increase his profitability. 
b. Knowledge and understanding gaps among key stakeholders 
 
Lack of data and inadequate problem definition contribute to two key knowledge gaps that undermine 
the ability of startups to better formulate their business plans, develop and target their product, convince 
investors to finance them, and help farmers. One is between startups and investors and the other is 
between startups and farmers.104 
b.1 Startup-investor understanding gap 
 
Many startups think many investors are insufficiently familiar with the agricultural sector and note that 
many investors’ backgrounds are in either the technology or marketing sectors; with an insufficient 
understanding of the agricultural sector, these investors cannot appropriately assess the value or 
importance of AgTech ventures. This view is clearly articulated by one startup entrepreneur: 
 
The problem is that investment people are not usually from the agricultural sectorial 
background, so some of the nitty gritty of what you are trying to explain is something they 
don't understand. If I have to explain about Swiggy, I say, ‘I need to order some food and there 
is a product to bring in the food.’ They understand and can visualize this. If the same workflow 
in the agri space is explained, they won’t understand because the background they come 
from is different. The challenge is educating the investors. They grew up in another 
environment. 
 
Another understanding gap is that many investors do not recognize that farmer trust is a non-trivial entry 
barrier that affects customer acquisition time and cost. As such, investors are prone to be too optimistic 
and unrealistic about customer acquisition costs and schedules. Investors with little or no agricultural 
sector experience can misinterpret and be uncomfortable with the calculus needed for a realistic 
assessment of AgTech business opportunities. This includes, as one startup entrepreneur pointed out, 






104 Often investors want to grow the user base first rather than increase financial performance, which 




Investors look for specialized companies and what we’ve learnt over time is that specialization 
in agri doesn’t work. There are not enough margins in one set of products/services to survive as 
a company. Success lies in the entire value chain and… [not] to specialize [in] only one thing.  
 
Another startup founder more bluntly stated:  
 
Investors don’t go out to their field. They sit in a room. Investors don’t know the ground-level 
problems. 
 
The mismatch between AgTech startups and investors is to some extent, as noted by one respondent, a 
difference of culture, and a priori leads to divergent expectations, as illustrated in one investor’s 
expectation that their investment should have a “presence across crops and regions, and multiple 
customers” while a startup countered that “agri problems are very localized in nature.” 
 
Investors quite naturally base their expectations on their experiences and these are mostly in non-
AgTech sectors. As illustrated in the Hyderabad case study, about 90% of investor activity consists of non-
AgTech investments (see Chart 13). This mismatch leads to divergent expectations about a whole slew of 
key metrics, such as growth and return on investment parameters, which are more difficult to achieve in 
AgTech. As one startup founder noted:  
 
What is the return on investment timeline? What can be done? This is the investment and this 
is the return. These issues are less clear in AgTech. 
 
b.2 Startup-farmer understanding gap 
 
While some investors recognize that farmers are poor, slow to adopt technology, and that the AgTech 
sector is different from other sectors, some of these same investors think that startup founders have 
inadequate knowledge about the agricultural sector. One investor polled noted:  
 
Startups often have an incomplete understanding of farmers’ needs.  
 
Another investor observed: 
 
Most AgTech entrepreneurs don’t have a good understanding of the risks involved in a specific 
market. Either because the problem the team is trying to solve is too easy to solve or they have 
not done enough market research for users to use their product. 
 
Concurring, one startup noted that very few AgTech startups come from the agricultural sector and an 
investor noted that most startups come from the technology or business sectors. Lacking farmer-level 
knowledge makes it difficult as to be successful:     
 
Requires the right background to understand what the farmer goes through on a day-to-day 
basis.  
 
This unfamiliarity with the agricultural sector makes it difficult for startups to communicate with farmers 
about their products or services. One investor noted this challenge:   
 
In AgTech, the end users are farmers … and not many [AgTech] people know how to calibrate 
their messaging accordingly.  
 
When agricultural practices and behaviors are rooted in local customs and cultures, change and the 
adoption of new behaviors is contextual. Given the complexities of the estimating the success of AgTech 
solutions due to a multitude of independent variables, communication and trust are central issues. One 




The key to success is the patience one needs to maintain while interacting with the client, as 
clients are hesitant when it comes to acceptance of new technology. 
 
This suggests that successful AgTech startup offerings to farmers require more than the establishment 
of simple transactional relationships. As one investor observed:  
 
It is about the trust and that’s something we have to show along with vision and quality 
management.  
 
In a similar vein, another investor said: 
 
Success in AgTech depends on a startup’s ability to convince farmers and to be accepted by 
farmers.  
 
5.5 AgTech ecosystem at early stage of development 
 
The fifth inhibiting dynamic is that the Indian AgTech ecosystem is at a nascent development stage and 
that the financial and technical networks needed to support that ecosystem are underdeveloped. A 
range of Hyderabad survey findings, the India landscape review, and the four dynamics discussed 
previous point to the same conclusion: the startup AgTech ecosystem is in an early stage of development. 
Consider the following four respondents’ observations: 
 
In the ecosystem in which we work, is the market ready? Some products may cut costs or 
increase revenues for farmers, but the market is not ready.  
 
The ecosystem for agriculture startups is in [a] budding stage and there are very few players in 
the agri sector. 
 
If it’s a mature ecosystem, you have easy access to investors, mentors, or incubators, but this is 
not the case in agri.  
 
A lot has to be done within the startup ecosystem. We are still at the tip of the iceberg.  
 
 
Key Finding 7: Interlocking, reinforcing dynamics impeding startups 
 
The syntheses of the landscape review, survey and interview results reveal five dynamics that interact 
with each other in ways that impede AgTech startups’ profitability and transition to scale:  
 
1. Smallholder farmers are poor:  The economic reality of the AgTech sector is that smallholder farmers 
tend to be poor and are not yet viable startup customers; 
2. Inadequate Investment: There is a lack of financial investment in the AgTech ecosystem;  
3. AgTech adoption is slow: Digital technology adoption is slower in the agriculture sector than in other 
sectors; 
4. Insufficient data: There is insufficient data about the on-farm context and priorities that can drive 
business cases and help target AgTech innovation objectives; and 
5. The AgTech ecosystem is young: The AgTech ecosystem is still developing and most startups are in 





6 Accelerating startup transition to 
scale  
 
A starting point to discuss what can be done to accelerate AgTech startups’ transition to scale is to 
recognize that in nascent startup ecosystems all paying customers are also early adopters and most 
potential consumers have extremely low levels of understanding and familiarity about the goods and 
services AgTech startups can provide. As such, startups’ profit margins are less than when economies of 
scale are reached. With sub-optimal network effects, each additional AgTech startup customer is more 
costly to acquire and less profitable to maintain than they are when there is a network effect. This 
condition will persist until the ecosystem can generate a sufficient number of customers and a 
concomitant network is in effect, at which point a startup’s transition to scale will be less difficult.  
 
Given this challenge, our findings suggest there are eight-broad-based actions that can help mitigate 
the negative dynamics and support startups’ transitions to scale: 
 
1. Support supply and demand aggregation;  
2. Facilitate bundling technologies and services around multiple customer needs; 
3. Support data gathering for business case development;  
4. Target small- to medium-sized farms;  
5. Develop new connections between established FoodTech firms and small-medium farms to 
foster new, disruptive business models;  
6. Incentivize investors; 
7. Replicate other successful startup offerings that are not yet operating at scale, but which 
could be with a small reconfiguration or innovation; and 
8. Build AgTech startup business capacities in agriculture. 
 
 
Here is how each of these actions can support startups’ transitions to scale: 
 
 
1. Support supply and demand aggregation 
 
Supply and demand aggregation can help startups acquire more customers by facilitating the growth 
and/or concentration of its customer base, the lack of which is an impediment to AgTech startups’ 
transitions to scale. Such aggregation alters market conditions in ways that may provide market access 
to new entrants and also enables the ecosystem to mature. 
 
The current dispersed supply and demand for AgTech startup products and services is similar to that 
encountered by Internet service providers in the mid and late 1990s. At that time, Internet consumers in 
developing economies were rare, and customers who did exist were victims of high costs and uncertain, 
if not pitiful, service. As a result, Internet service seemed unlikely to spill over from an elite-centric clientele 
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to a more widespread and diffused market of many more users.105 Yet it did. In the early 2000s, the 
Internet ecosystem became much more vibrant, with many more users, better service, and cheaper rates. 
This was partially a result of demand and supply aggregation strategies that were implemented in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s.106 This aggregation provided a basis for increased infrastructure investments, 
especially in the areas of international and terrestrial fiber optic connectivity. The lower connectivity costs 
expanded the customer base and further increased demand. 
 
Examples of supply and demand aggregation in the Indian AgTech sector include equipment-leasing 
models, such as MITRA’s drone spraying, Ecozen’s solar pumps and cold storage, and JFarm’s tractors. 
Supply aggregation in the form of leasing and fractionalized-use models to distribute increments of 
supply and allow more customers to buy a product can help aggregate demand. Leasing models also 
provide startups with the ability to shift their equipment and investment from one location to another at 
different times in the growing season, increasing their ability to aggregate demand. This strategy can 
provide startups with additional avenues to generate revenue and reach scale, as a startup can begin 
with a smaller investment and move to a greater one as it builds a record of return on investment and 
demonstrates its value to farmers and investors. As a startup’s reputation among farmers and investors 
grows, trust increases as well, enabling a startup to move to a larger market or more capital-intensive 
market niches. One example of this process is Ecozen, which first provided smart solar-powered pumps, 
before moving on to analytics and solar-powered, cold storage unit services.107  Started with an 
investment of just under US$25,000 in 2013108 , the company received a US$6 million investment in 2019 
and had total investments of about US$9 million by 2021.109  
 
Indian AgTech startups currently engaged in supply and demand aggregation include NinjaCart and 
Kalgudi. A similar model is being successfully used by Twiga foods in Kenya. These companies buy 
produce from multiple farmers (supply aggregation) to sell to multiple shops (demand aggregation). Key 
to these companies’ operations is digital technologies that can “lower cost, increase speed, and eliminate 
waste.”110 Among the potential next step scaling opportunities for these startups are to add both cold 
storage and larger distribution centers. Noteworthy is Ecozen’s anticipated expansion into the Kenya 
market. 
 
Supply and demand aggregation are important because they can, as noted, alter market conditions for 
market entrants in ways that provide them with market access and enables them to grow and expand, 
and also facilitates ecosystem maturation. As a result of aggregation, costs can be decreased and the 
quality of service improved, which expands the potential customer base. Aggregation also makes a 
service more valuable to users, startups, and investors, as it is an important means by which to achieve 
network effects.111 Supporting projects or policies that can facilitate supply or demand aggregation can 







105 Wilson, Ernest J. III and Kelvin Wong, editors.  Negotiating the Net in Africa: The Politics of Internet Diffusion. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2007. 
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ecosystems. 
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108 IBID. 
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110 Krishna, Prabodh. “NinjaCart: A Disruptor in the Food Supply Chain,” Business World, March 2019. 
111 One other possible effect of aggregation is that it can provide a political constituency able to advocate for farmer 
interests. Advocacy can be particularly important for the regulatory environment, which can significantly impact the 
rate of diffusion of new technologies and their applications.  
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2. Facilitate bundling of technologies and services around multiple customer needs  
 
Farmers have complex livelihoods that extend beyond the specific benefit any one AgTech product or 
service offers. As a result, bundled services that link solar power, digital financial services, and data 
services to agricultural services, for example, provide more avenues that a farmer can use to reach 
financial sustainability. When Ninjacart bundled information services with collection centers close to 
farmers and electronic payments, it was providing multiple layers of additional value for potential 
customers. 
 
Bundling services is a specific strategy to aggregate demand. Adding multiple related services not only 
increases the size of the potential customer base, but also fosters and increases customer loyalty and can 
help support network effects.  
 
3. Support data gathering for business case development 
 
A lack of adequate decision-making data to support AgTech startup business cases seriously impedes 
them reaching scale and the paucity of data combined with, as previously discussed, the complexity of 
the agricultural production processes and the cost-benefit calculus of collecting data about it, 
complicates the process of startups reaching scale.  
 
Public good actors in government and elsewhere, including commercial and social advocacy 
associations, think tanks and other constituencies, can help to develop, generate, and disseminate 
business case data. This can help close knowledge gaps that may exist between investors and startups. 
Business case data can help startups develop more robust business plans that can better meet investor 
expectations and, at the same time, can more realistically ground investor expectations. 
  
4. Target small-medium farms  
 
Both the national Indian landscape study and the Hyderabad case study indicate that smallholder 
farmers are, for a range of reasons, unlikely to be early AgTech adopters and are also currently among the 
least likely AgTech startup customers.  
 
A challenge for AgTech startups and smallholder farmers alike is related to smallholder farmers’ 
economic status. Smallholder farmers have little crop surplus, are often dependent on intermediaries or 
state procurement programs to market the surplus they do have, and many eat what they grow. As 
previously noted, nearly half of smallholder farmers in India generate roughly half of their household 
incomes from off-farm activities. As such, any income benefit on-farm activities generate would be a 
maximum of a 50% contribution to their household income. This means that their revenue-generating 
capacity is less than if their entire crop was for sale or if their entire income was generated from on-farm 
activities. This makes investing in productivity-enhancing digital technologies less interesting for them 
than it would be if more of their income was generated from farming. Farmers with larger farms, who 
generate a greater percentage of their income from on-farm activities, are more likely to be interested in 
making AgTech investments to grow crops and to sell them for increased profit and income. On this 
basis, it is important to ask “What types of farmers should an AgTech startup target as its early adopter 
customers?” The clear answer is larger, small farmers.  
 
This suggests that startups should consider concentrating on small-to medium-sized farms as early 
adopters and concentrate on acquiring customers in those states in which there is a smaller proportion 
of smallholder farmers (e.g. Nagaland, Punjab, Rajasthan), while avoiding those states in which there are 
a greater proportion of smallholder farmers (e.g. Kerala, Lakshadweep, and Bihar). This will help foster 
network effects and demonstrate the viability of AgTech to interested smallholder and marginal farmers. 
 
One exception may be for startups to concentrate on small farms in niche markets, such as farmers who 
grow higher-priced crops. Here, demand and supply aggregation may help define scenarios in which 
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agricultural productivity and yields can be improved such that some smallholder farmers can embrace 
the means used to achieve those improvements.  
 
5. Develop new connections between established FoodTech firms and small- to 
medium-sized farms to foster new, disruptive business models: 
 
One way to onboard larger numbers of smallholder farmers to AgTech is for public interest actors, such 
as government and non-profit organizations, to help build connections between established firms in the 
US$2.2 billion FoodTech sector and small- to medium-sized farms. For established FoodTech sector firms, 
connecting with small- to medium-sized farmers as suppliers or customers could be a complement to 
their existing business model, perhaps as a spin-off. Creating these kinds of new business models to serve 
low-income customers would be a disruptive innovation in the agriculture industry, changing how 
business is done.  
 
One successful example of this strategy is NinjaCart, which started in 2015 as a grocery-delivery platform. 
In 2016, NinjaCart: 
 
 
realized that the fundamental problem in the farm produce supply chain was the high 
asymmetry in supply and demand, which led to price volatility and this situation makes it a big 
gamble for a farmer. The farmer also had to spend a huge amount of money on transport 
besides wasting time at collection centers. After exploring options as to how it could solve this, 
in early 2016, NinjaCart changed its business model. 
Ninjacart now helps farmers know the exact demand for a commodity and its reigning price 
even before harvesting starts. It has also established collection centers for farmers within a 20 
km radius so that they do not have to spend more than two hours in transporting their 
supplies. Also, it makes the payment directly into the bank account of the farmer within 24 
hours. With all these changes, the farmer is now able to earn 15%-20% more.112 
 
Another example of such a partnership approach is one created by Kagome Foods and small farms in 
Maharashtra to standardize tomato output for commercial processing as well as to stabilize the output 
and costs of commercial processing.113 The company’s annual production was 20,000 tons and it attracted 
US$7 million in investments.114  
Given the sharp downturn in FoodTech investment in 2020, firms and startups operating in these market 
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6. Incentivize investors 
 
As previously discussed, one clear result from this research is that investor participation in the AgTech 
startup ecosystem is very low compared to other sectors. While there have been some successes, the 
many risks and few rewards of the AgTech ecosystem relative to other startup ecosystems are simply too 
great to attract sufficient investment. Aside from the risks, a key difference between the returns on 
investments for AgTech investors versus other investors is that the period in which they need to generate 
the same return on investment is much longer and more uncertain in AgTech than it is in other sectors. 
One consequence of this, as one respondent noted, is: 
 
A venture capitalist with a five-year return horizon is unlikely to invest in AgTech.  
 
The longer payoff timeframe for AgTech startup investors and the increased uncertainty of achieving any 
return on investment suggests that a primary means for funding AgTech will either be grant based or 
from social impact investors, or some combination of the two with added funding provided by for-profit 
investors. This is unlikely to change in the near future and underscores the importance of public-interest 
actor funding to mitigate the risks for for-profit investors, which they may need to become more active 
investors. 
 
One such success story in India is Cropin’s US$4 million Series B financing from Chiratae Ventures, which 
was complemented with funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. While these types of 
partnerships take time to develop, they are critical for transforming a nascent startup ecosystem into one 
driven by private equity investments.  
 
Another successful approach is state-led initiatives that attract investments. Between 1996 and 2006, the 
state of Gujarat increased its agricultural GDP growth rate from 3% to 10%, surpassing the national 
agricultural GDP growth rate of 3% in the same period. This was the result of the state government’s 
ability to shift farmers from less profitable crops to higher profit margin horticultural products.115 This type 
of increased growth rate provides additional incentive for investors. 
 
Public interest actors can leverage their good offices, advocacy, and finances to mitigate investor and 
startup risk by collaborating with investors and public policy makers. Public interest actor interventions 
can range from direct investment to public subsidies that help farmers transition to more profitable 
crops, and can ensure operations adhere to established food quality standards, which is required for 
successful, large commercial food processing operations. Public interest actors can also work to establish 
functional relationships among startups, investors, and public economic development agencies, such as 
the Indian Universal Service Obligation Fund, which has close to US$7.5 billion in undispersed funds.116,117 
 
Direct funding by public interest actors may be required to provide the incentive for investors to make 
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activity in food and agriculture is lower than the total start up activity in all sectors, mainly because of risk 
and lower market incentives and, therefore, requires state support to overcome market failure.”  118    
 
 
7. Target replication of other successful startup offerings not at scale with small 
reconfiguration or innovation 
 
Many AgTech startups have proven to be successful businesses, but have been unable to reach scale. A 
small, incremental change in their approach may trigger a positive, revolutionary change. A startup that 
replicates a key idea or approach of a competitor can bring new insight to the industry by observing the 
actions—and mistakes—of a competitor that will allow it to ultimately make a more successful offering. 
(Some “me too” startups were valued by potential investors for this reason.)  
 
Examples of this approach that have begun to gain momentum in AgTech are digital platforms that 
intermediate key agricultural activities in new ways. Digital platforms are, for example, enabling the 
rental of farm equipment and facilitating and expanding connections between producers and buyers. 
They link customers and providers in much the same way the Uber links drivers and passengers. 
NinjaCart, as discussed, and Jumbotail, for example, connect Indian farmers to their consumers and these 
firms have raised US$164 million119 and US$24 million,120 respectively, in VC investment. Digital platforms 
can also help accelerate the cost recovery of capital-intensive investments and have been successfully 
applied to tractor and harvester equipment leasing,121 as well as, to a lesser extent, cold storage. Executing 
a similar aggregation strategy may prove to be a key to success when targeting small-to-medium-sized 
farmers.  
 
Digital platform strategies are expanding to precision agriculture. The approach is currently being 
applied to precision sprayer leasing firm MITRA. Platforms could be developed for leveraging other 
emerging digital technologies, such as linking remote sensing imagery for the farm with on-farm sensing 
technologies to develop new services. 
 
8. Build startup business capacities in agriculture 
 
One key observation about the AgTech sector noted by commentators, analysts, and investors in the 
landscape review and respondents in the Hyderabad case study is that many, if not most, AgTech 
startups are insufficiently familiar with the business of AgTech and do not have the expertise to manage 
an AgTech business. They do not have clear ideas about how their products add value for the farmer, how 
they will acquire customers beyond the initial growth stage, and who will pay them. This is indicative of 
insufficient expertise in running an AgTech business.  
 
It is important for startups to have the business expertise to develop and drive business plans, to 
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only reason startups have difficulty running their businesses. Part of the problem is that startups either 
do not understand or misunderstand the economic reality of agriculture. They do not know who may be 
a viable customer and who can afford their products, and they cannot articulate how can they reach or 




Key Finding 8: Counteracting Agency 
 
Based on the five dynamics that impede Indian AgTech startups’ transitions to scale, there are eight 
actions we identified to counteract them:  
 
1. Support supply and demand aggregation;  
2. Facilitate the bundling of AgTech technologies and services around multiple customer needs;     
3. Support the development of AgTech ecosystem data for business case development;  
4. Target small-medium sized farmers;  
5. Develop new connections between established FoodTech firms and small-medium-sized farmers;  
6. Incentivize investors;  
7. Replicate other successful but un-scaled startup offerings with minor reconfiguration or innovation; 
and 





In the two decades since the emergence of digital agriculture, the range and variety of digital agricultural 
services and products that can be delivered to farmers has increased dramatically. The key tool for 
delivering digital agricultural information and services to date has been the mobile phone. It has evolved 
from sending text messages of less than 160 characters, to sending and receiving e-mail, taking pictures 
and video, accessing the Internet, and continues evolving with a growing number of applications. These 
include in-field genomic and plant nutrition testing to monitor plant health, pests, and diseases, and the 
deployment of IoT sensors that enable precision irrigation to grow more crops with less water and inputs. 
Technological innovations such as high-resolution remote sensing and big data analytics are also being 
used to help inform agricultural policy makers at every level.   
 
Yet, successful digital innovations to date have largely been off-farm and focused on input (seeds and 
fertilizer), the creation of digital marketplaces, and the improvement of other services along the value 
chain, such as logistics, transport, and processing. With few exceptions, successes that have directly 
benefitted smallholder farmers have been rare. Results from both the India landscape review and the 
Hyderabad case study underscore how a majority of potential investors and innovators are positioned 
downstream and off-the-farm and within the FoodTech sector. In the AgTech space, most investment 
and innovation clusters exist in the pre-production and distribution segments of the value chain, rather 
than in the on-farm production segments. Investors and startup entrepreneurs tend to be uninterested 
in on-farm technologies.  
 
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the analyses of the Hyderabad case and review of the 
broader Indian AgTech landscape. First, the Indian AgTech startup ecosystem is not currently effective at 
directing or fostering digital innovations in such a way that smallholder livelihoods are improved. While 
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there is some promise this objective can be achieved, potential investors face strong disincentives for 
becoming involved in AgTech and are swayed by the greater incentives they believe exist elsewhere, 
which leads them to invest in other sectors. These difficulties are compounded by a lack of market and 
agricultural data that could be used to better support and guide digital innovation. Second, agricultural 
policy can be politically charged and complex, affecting the risks and enabling environment for AgTech 
in areas such as market structure, agricultural subsidies, and land tenure.   
 
India has one of the largest smallholder farmer populations in the world, a robust digital economy, and a 
diverse range of crops in different climates and environments. Evidence compiled in this report raises 
real concerns of whether AgTech can, in general, reach smallholder farmers. If AgTech is not succeeding 
in India, arguably the place it has the best chance to succeed, can it succeed anywhere else in the 
developing world?  
 
We think this study’s conclusions can largely be generalized to other country cases. The India core 
ecosystem dynamics discussed in section five are consistent with the research results found in other 
country cases.122 ,123 ,124 It makes sense, too: smallholders worldwide tend to be the poorest potential 
consumer segment and of the least interest to potential investors, while the inherent risk and complexity 
found in agriculture creates strong disincentives for attracting meaningful investment. Interventions to 
reverse these trends will have some commonality across developing economies. Public interest actors 
such as governments, research organizations, non-profits, and industry associations can play a role in 
organizing the market in ways that expand the reach and impact of AgTech. They can help align public, 
private, and non-profit investment; facilitate the co-design of meaningful products and services with 
smallholders; and build the data ecosystem to support market analysis and the development of new 
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